Brain Booster for UPSC & State PCS Examination (Topic: Disqualification Shadow on 7 Nagaland MLAs)

Brain Booster for UPSC & State PCS Examination

Topic: Disqualification Shadow on 7 Nagaland MLAs

Disqualification Shadow on 7 Nagaland MLAs

The Kohima Bench of the Gauhati High Court has directed Nagaland Assembly Speaker Sharingain Longkumer to conclude the disqualification proceedings against seven lawmakers of the Opposition Naga People’s Front (NPF) and pass appropriate orders within six weeks from June 2.

On April 24, 2019, the NPF filed disqualification petitions against its seven suspended MLAs for “wilfully” defying its collective decision to support the Congress candidate in the 2019 Lok Sabha polls.
On March 25, 2019, MLAs N. Thongwang Konyak, Eshak Konyak, E.E. Pangteang, B.S. Nganglang, Toyang Chang, Kejong Chang and C.L. John rebelled and issued a written declaration to support Tokheho Yepthomi, rival candidate of the Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP), who eventually won.
The NDPP rules Nagaland in alliance with the BJP.

In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi government inserted the 10th schedule in the Constitution that deals with the issue of disqualification of a member for changing his political party or for defying party’s direction by voting against or abstaining from voting by defying a party whip.
It lays down the rules and procedures for disqualification of a member from the house by its presiding officer. The presiding officer can act against such members on the complaints received by any other member of the house.
A member of either house of the Parliament or a legislative assembly attracts the provisions of disqualification if he voluntarily resigns from the party or when he defies the party’s directions and either votes against the party’s directions or abstains from voting in defiance of a party whip.
The Supreme Court has expanded the definition of ‘voluntary resignation’ in its decisions, saying that if a member indulges in anti-party activities without resigning from the party then it can be inferred that he has voluntarily given up the membership of the party.

According to the Tenth Schedule, it requires at least two-third members of a legislature party to form a new political group, or ‘merge’ with another political party without getting disqualified under the anti-defection law.
However, this provision was done away with by the 91st amendment to the Constitution in 2003. The amendment, which came into force in January 2004, does not recognise a ‘split’ in a legislature party.
Instead, it recognises a ‘merger’ that requires at least two-third members of a legislature party to join another political formation or form a new one without inviting the wrath of the anti defection law.

The 10th schedule of the Constitution bars judicial scrutiny of a speaker’s decision to disqualify a member on account of defection or anti-party activities. ( However, the top court struck down this provision in a judgement in 1992.
The Supreme Court held that a presiding officer’s decision was open to judicial scrutiny by high courts and Supreme Court.

The removal of the split provision prompted political parties to engineer wholesale defections (to merge) instead of smaller ‘retail’ ones. Legislators started resigning from the membership of the House in order to escape disqualification from ministerial berths.
The ceiling on the size of the Council of Ministers meant an increase in the number of positions of parliamentary secretaries in states. The Speakers started taking an active interest in political matters, helping build and break governments. The anti-defection law does not specify a timeframe for Speakers to decide on defection proceedings. When the politics demanded, Speakers were either quick to pass judgment on defection proceedings or delayed acting on them for years on end.
The long drawn-out events in the Karnataka Vidhan Sabha have shown that even after three decades, the anti defection law has not been able to stop political defections.