Safeguarding the Indian Ocean's Seabed : Daily News Analysis

Date : 14/09/2023

Relevance: GS Paper 3 - Security- Coastal Security

Keywords: Seabed warfare, Submarine Cables, chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, Seabed Mining

Context-

  • Amidst the evolving landscape of seabed warfare trends in Europe, concerns arise about the potential extension of these threats into the Indian Ocean, particularly in light of heightened regional tensions, particularly with China.
  • Despite these challenges, the Indian Ocean is witnessing a surge in the development of critical infrastructure, primarily submarine cables and pipelines.

Nations Reach Accord to Protect Marine Life on High Seas

Seabed Warfare in Europe

  • Nord Stream Sabotage: In September 2022, a significant incident of seabed sabotage occurred, targeting the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines. These pipelines were vital offshore natural gas conduits in the Baltic Sea, directly connecting Russia and Germany while supplying energy to other Western European nations. Three explosions rocked the seabed infrastructure, resulting in the destruction of three out of the four pipelines. This destructive act not only disrupted gas flow but also released methane into the Baltic Sea, further compounding environmental concerns. The consequences of this sabotage were far-reaching, exacerbating Europe's ongoing energy crisis. With Nord Stream currently non-operational, the region faced increased challenges in meeting its energy demands.
  • Russian Seabed Surveys in Europe: Russian Yantar survey ships have been conducting extensive seabed surveys near critical infrastructure sites across Europe in recent years. The Yantar's activities are suspected to include intelligence missions such as laying cable taps, removing foreign taps from Russian cables (referred to as "delousing"), and even cable cutting.
  • Regional Cable Disruptions: In addition to disruptions associated with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there has been a notable increase in submarine cable sabotage incidents. These acts of sabotage have had repercussions in various regions. In January 2022, Norway witnessed an act of sabotage when saboteurs severed the Svalbard cable. This cable was critical as it connected the Svalbard Satellite Station, serving as a link for satellite antennas and representing the northernmost cable in existence.

Submarine Cables: Lifelines of Data

  • The Indian Ocean has become a crucial conduit for submarine cables that not only interconnect nations within the region but also facilitate the global transmission of data. Much like the vital arteries of global shipping, these submarine cables follow sea lines of communication.
  • The routes they take include navigating through strategic chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, such as the Cape of Good Hope, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Malacca, and the Sunda Strait.
  • India serves as a pivotal hub for submarine cable landing sites, with Mumbai and Chennai playing critical roles. However, the prominence of these hubs also exposes them to potential vulnerabilities.
  • Australia, on the other hand, relies on the Sunda Strait route from Singapore for most of its Indian Ocean connections, primarily landing in Perth.

The Rising Importance of International Subsea Pipelines and Seabed Mining

  • The future of the Indian Ocean will witness an increasing reliance on international subsea pipelines, especially for India. Iran is contemplating the extension of its subsea natural gas pipeline from Oman to India, establishing a connection with Porbandar in Gujarat.
  • In a significant development, a US$5-billion undersea gas pipeline project, proposed by the international consortium South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE), aims to deliver a substantial 31 million metric standard cubic meters of gas per day to India over a 20-year contract. This project also includes a connection to Gujarat.
  • India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), operating off the country's west coast, manages an extensive network of subsea pipelines, connecting major fields such as Mumbai High, Neelam, Heera, and Bassein.
  • The Indian Ocean is witnessing active exploration of seabed mining, particularly for polymetallic nodules that are abundantly found.

Increasing importance of Offshore Renewable Infrastructure

  • Australia has prioritized the establishment of offshore renewable infrastructure, including offshore wind and solar farms, wave energy facilities, and undersea interconnectors. These initiatives span various coastal sites, including the Indian Ocean.
  • Australia recently approved its first offshore wind zone in the Bass Strait, marking a significant milestone in renewable energy development.
  • Australia is also poised to export solar power to Singapore through the Sub Cable Australia–Asia PowerLink, heralded as the world's longest undersea high-voltage direct current cable, with a value exceeding AU$30 billion. This ambitious cable would transmit solar-generated electricity from the Lombok Strait to Singapore, significantly reducing the latter's reliance on gas for electricity generation.
  • Australia's North West Shelf hosts an extensive network of gas pipelines in the Indian Ocean, connecting offshore extraction sites to the mainland.

Australia and India's Responses to Seabed Defence Challenges

  • In April 2023, Australia's Department of Defence made a noteworthy move by purchasing the 107-metre-long Norwegian-flagged vessel MV Normand Jarl, set to be renamed the Australian Defence Vessel (ADV) Guidance. This acquisition marks a significant step in Australia's response to emerging seabed warfare threats.
  • Despite this acquisition and notable developments, Australia has not officially disclosed a comprehensive seabed defense strategy.
  • In March 2022, India took steps toward enhancing its seabed critical infrastructure protection capabilities by securing a contract to build two multipurpose vessels for the Indian Navy. However, public statements have not clarified whether these vessels will be utilized for seabed defense purposes. These vessels are slated for delivery in May 2025.
  • India is actively investing in the development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to bolster its seabed defense capabilities. Notably, an ambitious extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) development project is underway, envisioning the delivery of twelve XLUUVs, each with a substantial length of up to 50 metres.
  • In July 2023, India's state-owned Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) achieved a significant milestone by launching an indigenous autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). This AUV possesses versatile capabilities, including mine detection and disposal, as well as underwater surveys. Additionally, India is actively working on the development of smaller AUVs.

Challenges in Seabed Defence

  • Despite these commendable developments and acquisitions, India faces challenges in effectively addressing the unique threats posed by seabed warfare. Notably, submarine communications cables landing in India have yet to be fully integrated into the country's critical information infrastructure system.
  • Furthermore, there is a conspicuous absence of a specialized agency tasked with safeguarding India's underwater infrastructure, emphasizing the need for a more comprehensive approach to seabed defense beyond ASW.
  • Given the proliferation of seabed critical infrastructure, the defense of seabed assets is now a matter of public concern rather than just a military one. It is essential to bring discussions on seabed defense out of the classified realm. At the very least, both Australia and India should integrate seabed warfare considerations into their defense strategies.
  • More comprehensive strategies should follow the French model, encompassing elements such as defining governance frameworks for responding to seabed warfare incidents, specifying acquisition needs, and outlining plans for human resource development and partnerships in seabed warfare.
  • These strategies should consider seabed warfare as relevant to maritime approaches, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and areas of interest in international waters. Since seabed warfare capabilities are still evolving for India and Australia, the primary focus should be on capability development before these capabilities can be incorporated into respective doctrines.

Conclusion

  • Unlike Europe, the Indian Ocean region consists of numerous littoral and island nations, many lacking advanced navies or coast guards, and without a collective security framework like NATO. Australia and India, with their sophisticated maritime capabilities, should collaborate with these smaller regional nations to monitor and safeguard seabed infrastructure.
  • In May 2023, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) announced plans for a 'Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience,' with Australia launching the 'Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program.' The US also committed to providing support through its 'CABLES program.' However, it remains uncertain whether these initiatives will comprehensively address the threats of seabed warfare or focus solely on cable protection and network development advice.
  • Australia, India, and Indian Ocean nations should heed the lessons from the European seabed warfare threat. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has underscored that seabed infrastructure is vulnerable to state and non-state actors during wartime. Given the increasing scale of seabed infrastructure and society's growing reliance on it, the seabed domain must be a priority, subjected to public discourse, and integrated into national defense strategies.

Probable Questions for UPSC Mains exam -

  1. What were the consequences of the Nord Stream sabotage incident in September 2022, and how did it impact Europe's energy situation? (10 Marks, 150 Words)
  2. How are Australia and India responding to the challenges posed by seabed warfare, and what notable developments or acquisitions have they made in this regard? (15 Marks, 250 Words)

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